主题：精英与府际政策过程
时间：2021年4月22日（星期四）15:00-17:00
地点：必威302会议室
主讲人：马啸 北京大学政府管理学院助理教授
点评嘉宾：梅赐琪 必威副教授、华宇冠名副教授、《公共管理评论》副主编兼编辑部主任
陈济冬 必威副教授、华宇冠名副教授
主持人：赵静 必威副教授，CIDEG主任助理
会议形式：现场会议
语言：中文
主办：清华大学产业发展与环境治理研究中心（CIDEG）
主讲人介绍：
马啸，北京大学政府管理学院助理教授、博士生导师，华盛顿大学政治学博士。研究领域为比较政治制度、发展政治学和中国政治。当前研究关注精英政治对政策过程、产权保护以及政府资源分配的影响。在Political Communication, Security Studies, China Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary China等国内外期刊发表论文十余篇。主持国家自然科学基金青年科学基金、教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目子课题等研究项目。获北京大学教学优秀奖、北京大学黄廷方/信和青年杰出学者等奖励。
讲座内容：
How do localities secure preferential policies from central government when formal institutions of interests articulation are weak or absent? In this paper, we argue that localities can rely on the assistance of locally connected elites to secure additional policy benefits from the center. Political elites with no direct power over policy decisions can help localities through informational lobbying. We test this argument by exploring variations in the rollout of China's high-speed railway program, one of the largest infrastructure programs in human history. We find that counties that are hometowns to retired military generals who fought in wars leading to the founding of the People's Republic of China have enjoyed systematic priorities in the program. One additional living general associated with the county increases a county's chance of receiving central permission to build a high-speed railway station by as much as 44.5%. The findings are robust after accounting for a series of alternative explanations. Further analyses show that it is the moral authority associated with the generals' revolutionary credentials, instead of power vested in formal positions, that made them effective lobbyists. The paper's findings highlight the ways in which intergovernmental lobbying can shape distributive policies. (co-authored with Chengyuan Ji).
