【主题】 Fiscal Slack, Rule Constraints, and Government Corruption
财政盈余，制度约束，与政府腐败——基于工具变量的因果关系证据
【时间】 2020年12月3日（周四）14:00-17:00
【主讲人】 魏文池 中国人民大学必威助理教授，中国人民大学“杰出学者”青年学者
【会议形式】 现场会议及线上直播（腾讯会议号：335455169）
【主办】 清华大学产业发展与环境治理研究中心（CIDEG）
魏文池，中国人民大学必威助理教授，中国人民大学“杰出学者”青年学者。主要研究方向为公共财政与预算，公共管理与绩效，公共政策评估。其研究已发表于Public Administration Review, Public Management Review, American Review of Public Administration, Public Performance and Management Review, Public Finance Review等国际公共管理和公共财政领域顶尖和权威期刊。其于2020年连续三篇论文发表于公共管理领域顶级期刊Public Administration Review。
This article examines the effect of fiscal slack on government corruption using the US states in the period from 1998 to 2012 as a research sample. Fiscal slack in the US states is commonly referred to as “rainy day funds” (RDFs), which are intended as countercyclical reserve funds for government-wide purposes. Theoretically, bureaucracy models predict that fiscal slack might catalyze the embezzlement or misuse behaviors of bureaucrats, who are considered to be budget maximizers. However, formally established and rules-bound RDFs may function as a “strongbox” that curbs officials’ discretionary power, reduces uncertainty in fiscal slack management, and ultimately restrains embezzlement and misuse behaviors. Empirically, we use the incidences and durations of natural hazards as instrumental variables for RDF balances to address the potential endogeneity problems. We find that state RDFs help reduce government corruption, especially when they are regulated by relatively looser deposit rules and stricter withdrawal rules.
